server(filesystem): Delete tweaks

This commit is contained in:
Matthew Penner
2023-02-08 14:22:26 -07:00
parent 00451b38db
commit dcbc59790d
2 changed files with 127 additions and 14 deletions

View File

@@ -381,10 +381,9 @@ func (fs *Filesystem) TruncateRootDirectory() error {
// Delete removes a file or folder from the system. Prevents the user from
// accidentally (or maliciously) removing their root server data directory.
func (fs *Filesystem) Delete(p string) error {
wg := sync.WaitGroup{}
// This is one of the few (only?) places in the codebase where we're explicitly not using
// the SafePath functionality when working with user provided input. If we did, you would
// not be able to delete a file that is a symlink pointing to a location outside of the data
// not be able to delete a file that is a symlink pointing to a location outside the data
// directory.
//
// We also want to avoid resolving a symlink that points _within_ the data directory and thus
@@ -401,25 +400,65 @@ func (fs *Filesystem) Delete(p string) error {
return errors.New("cannot delete root server directory")
}
if st, err := os.Lstat(resolved); err != nil {
st, err := os.Lstat(resolved)
if err != nil {
if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
fs.error(err).Warn("error while attempting to stat file before deletion")
return err
}
} else {
if !st.IsDir() {
fs.addDisk(-st.Size())
} else {
wg.Add(1)
go func(wg *sync.WaitGroup, st os.FileInfo, resolved string) {
defer wg.Done()
if s, err := fs.DirectorySize(resolved); err == nil {
fs.addDisk(-s)
// The following logic is used to handle a case where a user attempts to
// delete a file that does not exist through a directory symlink.
// We don't want to reveal that the file does not exist, so we validate
// the path of the symlink and return a bad path error if it is invalid.
// The requested file or directory doesn't exist, so at this point we
// need to iterate up the path chain until we hit a directory that
// _does_ exist and can be validated.
parts := strings.Split(filepath.Dir(resolved), "/")
// Range over all the path parts and form directory paths from the end
// moving up until we have a valid resolution, or we run out of paths to
// try.
for k := range parts {
try := strings.Join(parts[:(len(parts)-k)], "/")
if !fs.unsafeIsInDataDirectory(try) {
break
}
t, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(try)
if err == nil {
if !fs.unsafeIsInDataDirectory(t) {
return NewBadPathResolution(p, t)
}
}(&wg, st, resolved)
break
}
}
// Always return early if the file does not exist.
return nil
}
// If the file is not a symlink, we need to check that it is not within a
// symlinked directory that points outside the data directory.
if st.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink == 0 {
ep, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(resolved)
if err != nil {
if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return err
}
} else if !fs.unsafeIsInDataDirectory(ep) {
return NewBadPathResolution(p, ep)
}
}
wg.Wait()
if st.IsDir() {
if s, err := fs.DirectorySize(resolved); err == nil {
fs.addDisk(-s)
}
} else {
fs.addDisk(-st.Size())
}
return os.RemoveAll(resolved)
}